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The Heterogeneity of Victim Impact Statements: A Content Analysis of Capital Trial Sentencing 







Victim Impact Statements (VIS) are controversial in capital sentencing proceedings largely due 
to their questionable relevance to sentencing, the concern that characterizations of the victim 
may lead to arbitrary sentencing judgments, and the belief that the emotional nature of this 
evidence may be inflammatory.  A sample of 192 capital trial VIS transcripts were analyzed for 
content as well as a linguistic analysis of their emotionality. The findings reveal that these 
statements are highly varied, including their format, length, and relation between the witness and 
the victim. Despite legislative mandate that they address the emotional, financial, and physical 
suffering experienced by victim survivors, testimony of this nature occurs in a minority of the 
cases.  Most commonly, these statements tend to characterize the victim and their qualities, relay 
the witness’ shock at first learning of the victim’s death (i.e., trauma narratives), and address the 
significance of the deceased to the family unit. In approximately one third of the transcripts 
reviewed, the witness made mention of the defendant, but this rarely included any mention of a 
desire for vengeance or recommended punishment.  Linguistic analysis revealed that emotional 
content was prevalent throughout the testimony, with sadness emerging as more pervasive than 
anger.  However, the degree of emotional language contained in these statements was not 
particularly high—and was comparable to that typically encountered in everyday life (e.g., 
newspapers, novels).  Implications, particularly with regard to the potential for victim impact 
statements to be considered inflammatory, are discussed.    
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 Victim Impact Statements (VIS) refer to statements given either in writing or orally that 
detail the impact of the defendant’s crime on victims. In capital trials, this testimony is delivered 
by victim survivors who have included members of the decedent’s family, but they have also 
been presented by friends, coworkers and even emergency first responders (Myers, Johnson, & 
Nunez, 2018). VIS is often described as educating the jury concerning both emotional as well as 
financial hardships that have arisen as a direct consequence of the loss of the victim. VIS appear 
regularly in courts in a number of countries such as the U.K., Australia, and Finland. In the 
United States, twenty-nine of the 31 states that currently enforce the death penalty allow for VIS 
during the penalty phase of the trial (Death Penalty Information Center, 2018). VIS in capital 
sentencing proceedings are controversial for a number of reasons, but chief among these issues 
are their relevance to the sentencing decision and the potential that their emotional nature may 
interfere with jurors’ capacity to decide in a reasoned and impartial manner (Myers & Greene, 
2004). These concerns were expressly addressed on three occasions by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Booth v Maryland (1987), South Carolina v. Gathers (1989), and Payne v Tennessee (1991).  
 
Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing: Concerns with Relevance of Victim 
Character and Potential for Emotionality of Testimony to be Inflammatory 
 The relevance of victim character information. The U.S Supreme Court first addressed 
the constitutionality of VIS in Booth v. Maryland (1987). In the penalty phase of the trial, the 
VIS provided by members of the family of the elderly couple who was murdered, and while the 
information concerned a variety of topics such as how family members continue to live in fear, it 




(Booth v. Maryland, 1987, p. 2536) and the degree to which they were beloved in the 
community. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that: “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital 
jury from considering victim impact evidence” on the grounds that the inclusion of such 
information “is irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision” and that admitting such evidence 
generates an “unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner” (Booth v Maryland, 1987, p. 503).  
 Of primary concern was the introduction of VIS may lead to the conclusion that qualities 
of the victim might determine the appropriate punishment of the defendant. These same concerns 
were raised later in South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) when the prosecutor read at length from 
contents found in the victim’s wallet in a manner designed to reveal positive characteristics about 
the victim. Justice Brennan noted that such information “cannot possibly have been relevant to 
the circumstances of the crime” (p. 2211). The decision in Gathers did little to extend the Court’s 
reasoning in Booth other than to clarify that it matters little how victim information is introduced 
(e.g., either by a witness or through the statements by the prosecutor; Myers & Greene, 2004).   
 In Payne v. Tennessee (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court returned to the question of 
whether the introduction of VIS in capital sentencing proceedings violates the defendant’s 8
th
 
Amendment rights. During the VIS, the victim’s mother spoke of her raising her grandson who 
lost both a mother and a baby sister. The extent to which the small boy still missed and asked 
about his mother and his sister was one of the key areas of concern in the VIS. In overruling both 
Booth and Gathers, the Payne decision underscored the perspective that VIS “in the majority of 
cases, and in this case…serves entirely legitimate purposes” (Payne v. Tennessee, 1991, p. 825). 
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in delivering the opinion of the Court, noted that barring VIS 




show…each victim’s uniqueness as a human being” (p.823). In quoting Gregg v. Georgia 
(1976), Rehnquist reiterated the long tradition of avoiding unnecessary restrictions on 
information that will aid the factfinder: “We think it desirable for the jury to have as much 
information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision” (Payne v. Tennessee, 
1991, p. 821).  
The emotionality of VIS and potential inflammatory effects. VIS sometimes evoke 
strong emotions into the penalty phase of the trial, and so concern has been expressed over the 
potential that this information will inflame the passions of the jury and lead to decisions based on 
emotion, rather than reason (Arrigo & Williams, 2003; Bandes, 1996; 2009; Blumenthal, 2001; 
Flamm, 1999; Myers, Weidemann, & Pearce, 2006).  Within the legal system, emotionality on 
the part of jurors is seen as antithetical to reason (Shaunessy, 1992). Yet, VIS are typically 
presented in a context in which emotion and the law are inextricably linked (e.g., see Nuñez, 
Estrada, Schweitzer, & Myers, 2016; Wiener, Bornstein & Voss, 2006). That is, even if the 
content of VIS (e.g., evidence of emotional harm and suffering) were not so powerful, these 
statements are sometimes presented before jurors in a manner that promotes emotional responses 
(e.g., crying witnesses, pictures and videos of the deceased, background music), and as some 
would argue, in many cases purposely so (Austin, 2010; Schroeder, 2010). Far from trying to 
reduce the emotional power of these statements, these emotional displays may be used by some 
in order to gain an edge in securing a death penalty judgment (Burr, 2003).  And, there appears 
to be little doubt that, in some instances at least, jurors are clearly moved by VIS testimony.  
Logan (1999) relays the case in the Timothy McVeigh trial for the bombing of the Federal 




testimony of a parent describing what it was like to hear that rescue crews were able to retrieve 
nothing but the hand of her two-year old daughter.  
The concern surrounding the emotionality of VIS and the potential to bias juror 
judgments arose repeatedly in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Booth and Payne. In Booth, 
the Court stated “one can understand the grief and anger of the family caused by the brutal 
murders in this case, and there is no doubt that jurors are aware of these feelings. But the formal 
presentation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury 
and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the 
defendant…any decision to impose the death sentence must ‘be, and appear to be, based on 
reason rather than caprice or emotion’ (Booth v. Maryland, 1987, 508, see also Gardner v. 
Florida, 1977). Because both the relevance of victim character information and the potential for 
the emotional nature of VIS to be inflammatory was central to the debate surrounding the 
constitutionality of VIS in capital sentencing, substantial jury decision making research has been 
conducted on these issues.   
Jury Simulation Studies Investigating the Effects of Victim Character Information  
 Some early research has indicated that factors surrounding the victim such as their 
likability has been related to punishment or judgments relevant to sentencing (e.g., Deitz, 
Littman & Bentley, 1984; Kerr & Kurtz, 1977). This pattern has been uncovered in actual trials 
where less reputable victims promote greater leniency toward the defendant (Baumer, Messner, 
& Felson, 2000).   
 In studies explicitly examining VIS and victim qualities, again we see evidence that 




(1999) found that when the reputation of the deceased victim in the VIS was varied, there were 
corresponding differences in ratings that are relevant to sentencing (e.g., rating of how emotional 
the victim’s family was and how serious the crime).  More recently, Mitchell, Myers & 
Broszkiewicz (2016) found that when qualities of the victim focused on their significant role in 
the family, jurors judged the harmfulness of the crime as greater and these harm judgments 
mediated the relation between VIS and sentencing.  Schweitzer and Nuñez (2017) found that 
participants were more likely to sentence defendants to death when the victim was of a higher 
SES.  Consequently, both trial outcomes as well as jury simulation studies provide converging 
evidence to suggest that varying qualities of the victim matters when jurors sentence the 
defendant.   
Jury Simulation Studies Investigating the Inflammatory Effects of VIS 
 Researchers have therefore sought to determine the effects of VIS on sentencing 
judgments, with a particular focus on whether VIS elicit strong emotions in jurors and whether 
these emotions are related to sentencing judgments.  Early studies in this area failed to uncover a 
clear pattern suggesting that VIS elicits strong emotions and that these emotions interfere with 
reasoned decision making.  The failure to uncover these effects, however, may have been due in 
part to a failure to distinguish between emotions of anger and sadness. In a number of these 
studies, emotional responses in jurors were either not measured (e.g., Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, 
1998), or were measured such that discrete emotions could not be determined (e.g., Myers, Lynn 
& Arbuthnot, 2002; Platania & Berman, 2006; Wevodau, Cramer, Kehn, & Clark, 2014). 
 The importance of measuring discrete emotional states finds support in social cognition 




sadness produce differential effects on judgments.  A detailed account of the role emotions play 
in juror judgments are beyond the scope of the present paper, but can be found elsewhere (e.g., 
see Feigenson & Park, 2006; Nuñez, Estrada-Reynolds, Schweitzer, & Myers, 2016).  This 
research indicates that different emotions have differential effects on how information is 
processed (e.g., Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Stack, 1990; Bower, 1981; Schwarz and Clore, 
1983).  More specifically, Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer (1994) found that angry 
participants showed evidence of reduced information processing relative to sad participants. 
Tiedens and Linton’s (2001) findings propose that anger elicits feelings of certainty, and 
certainty promotes less detailed information processing whereas sadness is associated with 
feelings of uncertainty and the tendency to engage in more extensive information processing.  
This research indicates anger may promote irrational (i.e., less reasoned) decisions, a pattern we 
should not see when sadness is evoked. Other models advanced by others (e.g., Haidt, 2001; 
Tetlock, 2002) propose that anger and sadness have differential effects on decisions, but for 
reasons associated with motivations to evaluate information differently, not because of 
differences in how extensively information is processed.  All of these models suggest that 
judgments may be impacted by emotions, but none of these models suggest anger and sadness 
are equally prejudicial. Therefore, the research on mood and judgment fail to confirm the broad 
characterizations voiced by legal commentators who describe all emotions as antithetical to 
reason (e.g., Shaunessy, 1992).       
Jury simulation studies that have assessed discrete emotions have tended to produce 
findings consistent with those in the emotions and judgment literature whereby anger is 
associated with more punitive responses in jurors. Paternoster and Deise (2011) found that 




vote for death (62.5%) than participants in the no-VIS condition (17.5%). The presentation of the 
VIS was associated with higher feelings of anger and vengefulness in participants, and those 
emotions partially mediated the relation between VIS and sentencing.  Similar findings emerged 
by Nuñez, Schweitzer, Chai, and Myers (2015) who presented all participants with a VIS and 
found that mock jurors who became angrier following the VIS were more likely to sentence to 
death than jurors who became sadder following the VIS (see similar findings by Georges, 
Weiner & Keller, 2013 in a study not employing VIS).  
Most recently, Nuñez , Myers, Wilkowski & Schweitzer (2017) randomly assigned death 
qualified mock jurors to watch one of six videotaped trials that crossed three levels of VIS (no 
VIS, Sad VIS, Angry VIS) with two levels of mitigating factors (weak vs. strong). The 
emotionality of the VIS was manipulated by altering both the content of the VIS and witness 
demeanor. Participants who witnessed the angry VIS were more likely to sentence to death than 
those who were assigned no VIS or witnessed the sad VIS. Additionally, those in the angry VIS 
condition rated the mitigating evidence as less important to their decisions.  In sum, while the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Booth and later in Payne highlighted the potential inflammatory effects of 
VIS, the findings thus far provide empirical support to the contention that: (1) VIS do elicit 
emotions in jurors, and (2) anger and not sadness has been linked to sentencing decisions.  
 This empirical evidence addressing the effects of VIS that elicit emotions in jurors is 
critical to determining whether VIS can be considered inflammatory. However, it is equally 
important to determine whether emotions such as anger and sadness are typically present in VIS. 
How typical is emotional content in VIS? In addition, while simulation studies show the 
importance of victim character on sentencing, it is not clear that character information frequently 




gaps in our information on VIS. Moreover, a content analysis of VIS also affords the opportunity 
to judge whether simulation research conducted thus far, in general (and not just the research 
addressing emotionality and character), adequately reflect the VIS jurors typically encounter in 
actual trials. 
Heterogeneity of VIS in Capital Trial Sentencing 
 The empirical findings using a jury simulation approach have failed to reveal consistent 
findings with regard to the effects of VIS on sentencing judgments (see Myers, Johnson, & 
Nuñez, 2018 for a review).  Quite understandably, the variables examined and samples tested 
have varied across these studies, and so has the content of the VIS. Whether there is such a thing 
as a typical VIS remains an unanswered question because researchers have not content analyzed 
VIS presented in capital trials with this question in mind.  Consequently, concerns regarding the 
emotional content of VIS, or the manner in which it is presented (e.g., multiple witnesses, 
identity of witness, presented in a written statement or through a question and answer format), 
are largely based on anecdotal reports rather than a systematic examination of VIS content and 
practices.  Moreover, if there are aspects of VIS that can be considered to be typical of this 
testimony, whether or not these aspects are reflected in the jury simulation stimuli presented to 
mock jurors would be an important consideration when evaluating the external validity of this 
research.  
 Variability of state statutes related to VIS.   We examined admissibility status of VIS 
for all 31 states that currently allow the death penalty, relying on Sanderford (2012) and 
www.deathpenalty.org as sources. In the 29 states that allow VIS during capital sentencing, the 




accounts (e.g., Blume, 2003), there remains wide latitude in how VIS are introduced. In some 
jurisdictions, the content and delivery of VIS has been strictly controlled. With the Payne 
decision in 1991, many states passed statutes allowing VIS during capital sentencing, but the 
statute placed strict limitations on the testimony to factors specifically relevant to mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances (Pitt, 2013). Furthermore, in some cases these statutes included 
provisions that the VIS could not include personal opinions about the defendant, or recommend a 
sentence, and the number of statements was limited to one family member (Castellano, 1996). 
Prior to abolishing the death penalty in 2007, New Jersey courts allowed VIS to be introduced 
only if the defendant offered evidence of his character in the context of mitigating evidence and 
courts were mandated to review the VIS prior to testimony, edit the emotional content out of the 
statement, and require that the witness testify only if they could refrain from emotional displays 
while testifying (Joh, 2000; Shanker, 1999).  
In some states, VIS are permitted, but the potential effects are benign given the timing of 
the statement. For example, Indiana permits the presentation of the VIS only after a sentencing 
decision has already been made, and further limits the testimony to information about the victim 
and the effects of the crime (Bivens v. State, 1994). But, we have little information about how 
frequently this post-sentencing practice occurs.  The Payne decision failed to provide sufficient 
direction with regard to how VIS are presented to jurors (Frankel, 2008; Myers & Greene, 2004; 
Platania & Berman, 2006), and states as well as federal courts have often been reluctant to place 
tight restrictions on what gets admitted during a VIS (Blume, 2003; Logan, 2006). Consequently, 
there is substantial heterogeneity in the content and procedural restrictions with regard to VIS 




 In addition to procedural variations in how VIS is presented in court, the identity of the 
VIS witness has also, for the most part (cf., McGowan & Myers, 2004) been ignored in the 
research literature. Although we know that some jurisdictions place limits on who may testify as 
a witness (e.g., only immediate family members), we know very little about who typically 
testifies in these cases. The emotional nature of VIS supposes that witness gender may be 
important in eliciting sympathy from the jury, but currently there is no information regarding 
whether females are more likely to testify than males.  Some jurisdictions allow multiple VIS 
testimonies, but again their frequency of occurrence is unknown as well as their effects because 
investigators have thus far failed to test the effects of VIS with more than a single witness.  
 In summary, given the wide latitude with regard to the format of VIS, the number of 
witnesses who may offer testimony, and the general lack of guidance or restrictions surrounding 
who may testify, the length of their testimony, or the content of the testimony, it is clear that VIS 
has the potential to vary greatly from case-to-case. It is therefore critical to carefully examine 
these differences in the administration of VIS and the content of VIS in order to better establish 
the degree to which the jury simulation research adequately reflects current practices.  
Studies Examining the Content of Victim Impact Statements 
Although the content of VIS in capital cases has generally been ignored, there are a few 
exceptions. Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells (2003) interviewed jurors about capital cases which 
included VIS and, for a small sample (n = 24) of jurors, some of the questions asked participants 
to identify which aspects of VIS were present in the testimony, along with listing aspects of the 
testimony they found to be influential in their sentencing judgments. Based on these interviews, 
Eisenberg et al (2003) concluded that two issues were most commonly found in VIS: (1) 




of the victim. Comparatively, rarely (12%) did the VIS contain information about which 
punishment the witness deemed was appropriate.  
More recently, Younglove, Nelligan, and Reisner (2009) examined a total of 42 capital 
trial transcripts from 1991-1998 obtained from Texas, New Jersey, and California and included a 
total of 80 witnesses who provided VIS. Younglove et al. confined their examination of the 
transcripts to evidence of victim character information. Because the majority of VIS testimonies 
came from California, which does not limit the number of witnesses who may testify (e.g., for 
one trial, 11 witnesses presented a VIS), the number of VIS testimonies was roughly twice the 
number of cases. The researchers found that victim character information, specifically 
information about the personality of the victim, was both “recurrent and prominent” (p. 542) in 
the transcripts. For example, in California where 45 separate VIS testimonies were analyzed, a 
total of 304 references were made to the victim’s character. Because their analysis was based on 
a large number of VIS transcripts, the article provides a detailed account of the type of character 
testimony that was typically expressed during a VIS. However, by focusing specifically on 
character information, the study did not reveal other areas of content that may frequently appear 
in VIS (e.g., the emotionality of the testimony, characterizations of the defendant, recommended 
punishment), nor did it specifically analyze procedural differences in the administration of VIS. 
Consequently, despite the many strengths of this study, there remain some important and 
unanswered questions regarding VIS content which merit further investigation.   
In the present study, we obtained trial transcripts from a large number of capital trials (n 
= 131) which yielded a large number of VIS transcripts (75 cases with 192 VIS statements). One 
goal of the present investigation was to get a clearer picture of common elements found in VIS in 




determine the prevalence of: relevant procedural factors (e.g., who testifies, how many, in what 
format, how lengthy?), testimony relating to information consistent with the stated purpose of 
VIS (e.g., financial, physical, psychological harm), as well as the prevalence of content that is 
not specifically identified in statutes or in some cases prohibited by states (e.g., victim character 
information, references to defendant, recommended punishment).  Upon receiving transcripts 
containing VIS, we learned that testimony comes in three general formats: (1) a free-narrative 
method whereby the victim survivor reads a prepared statement to the court; (2) a question and 
answer format where the prosecutor conducts a direct examination and, in rare cases, the defense 
attorney may cross-examine and (3) a post-sentencing VIS where the witness addresses the judge 
with the jury not in the court and so these statements have no impact on what the jury decides.   
A second goal of the present study was to address the degree of emotionality contained 
within VIS. As noted, empirical findings thus far suggest that angry responses to VIS are 
associated with greater likelihood of death penalty judgments whereas sad responses to VIS are 
unrelated to sentencing decisions.  Apart from anecdotal cases, the degree to which VIS contain 
emotional content, specifically anger or sadness, is unknown.  One way to obtain this 
information would be to assess the emotional language contained within the VIS transcripts 
using a program designed to measure the emotional valence of the words within the testimony. In 
this case, we used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program developed by 
Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis (2015).  Although this approach has its limitations (e.g., it is not 
sensitive to the context in which words appear), the program has been shown to measure 
emotional content (e.g., negative and positive emotion words) that correlate significantly with 




emotional content of the VIS transcripts using the LIWC program to assess the degree to which 
sad and angry content pervade VIS in capital trials.   
METHOD 
Transcript Selection  
 
The Institutional Review Boards of two institutions of which the authors were affiliated 
approved this study. The database of capital cases was obtained from the research by McCord 
(2005) who listed all life and death capital cases across the U.S. during the 2004 calendar year. 
The reason for choosing McCord’s (2005) list of capital cases as our sampling frame was simple. 
Though it is easy to find specific cases in a given year that result in the death penalty from 
websites such as www.deathpenalty.org, there is no corresponding database for life sentences. 
Thus, the best sampling frame was the complete set of cases obtained by McCord (2005). 
Though, these represent cases that were tried more than a decade ago, there have been no major 
court related changes during this time, and in the few states where there were changes (Arizona, 
Georgia, Idaho, and Washington), the new laws would not affect the content examined in the 
present investigation. 
 In 2004 there were 142 capital cases that resulted in the death penalty, and 120 that 
resulted in life sentences from jurors. Using this as our sampling frame, we obtained trial 
transcripts for 131 cases (52.8% of the death cases and 44.2% of the life cases) by contacting the 
Clerk of Courts in the various counties in which the trial took place. Of those, 75 cases (57%) 
contained VIS (35 life and 40 death sentences). We obtained transcripts from 28 of the 31 states 
that allow the death penalty, and obtained our largest number of transcripts from Texas (n=21), 




While the larger database we selected cases from (see McCord, 2005) allowed for 
identifying cases based on random selection, unfortunately, the prohibitive cost of many 
transcripts or extended delays in receiving requests meant that our sample of transcripts was not 
random. Transcripts were purchased based on a per-page basis, with the exception of instances in 
which they were obtained for free. A priori, we established a number of unreturned contact 
requests to the Clerk of Courts (three) and a per-page cost limit that determined whether a 
transcript was included in our sample.  However, whether the penalty phase contained a VIS was 
unknown to us at the time of purchase, and consequently selection of VIS testimonies was not 
systematic. Based on this approach, we obtained a very large number of VIS testimonies (n = 
192) which we could analyze. Methods for analyzing VIS content and emotional language are 
described below. 
Content Criteria and Categorization  
Our goal was to analyze the VIS transcripts and identify important factors which would 
have some relevance to the current debate surrounding the admissibility of VIS.  In addition to 
some demographic and procedural questions (e.g., gender of witness, relation of witness to 
victim, VIS length, manner in which VIS was introduced), the present investigation further 
identified a number of content areas that are of greatest relevance to the VIS debate: (1) financial 
harm, (2) physical harm, (3) psychological harm, (4) family significance of victim, (5) victim 
character, (6) expressed emotions, (7) referencing the defendant, (8) dehumanizing the 
defendant, (9) describing the crime, and (10) recommended punishment. Consequently, the 
specific factors we searched for in the transcripts were identified a priori, rather than following 
an initial analysis where common themes were identified. One exception to this method occurred 




describe the experience of learning the news that the victim had been murdered. In many 
instances, and often in dramatic fashion, witnesses would provide detailed accounts of how they 
learned that the victim had died.  This account was relatively easy to identify in transcripts and 
so content analyzers kept record of how often this information emerged in the course of the VIS 
and this became the 11
th
 content category.   
Scoring. Independent raters were senior undergraduate psychology students who were 
trained and supervised by a graduate student and the faculty directing the research lab. For each 
VIS, each rater independently read the VIS and scored each of these content areas as either 
present or absent. When statements could reasonably fall into two categories (e.g., family 
significance and financial harm), raters were instructed to choose the one category that was more 
clearly represented. Consequently, the percentages in each of the categories may under-report the 
frequencies by which categories are represented. Not unlike the tendency for factor analysis 
interpretation to use orthogonal rotation to better identify and label factors, we felt this scoring 
approach that necessitated scorers choosing one category or another (rather than multiple 
categories) would allow for easier interpretation of which content areas are more frequently 
represented within VIS relative to each other.  Raters were given examples of transcripts and 
trained for approximately 2 hours on how to score the transcripts according to the scoring criteria 
below. All 192 transcripts were scored independently by two raters and a third rater was assigned 
to evaluate the two ratings along with the transcript to resolve discrepancies in cases of 
disagreement.  
Financial harm. This measure includes any mention by the witness which suggests that 
there has been an economic impact, including whether there have been changes related to 




Psychological harm. This measure includes any mention of doctor visits for 
psychological services, or seeking treatment. It also includes mention of negative emotional 
experiences over a period of time (e.g., “it’s taken away my sense of well-being and peace of 
mind”), or recurrent negative emotional experiences (e.g., “[I] live with emotional difficulties”) 
or behavioral effects related to emotions (e.g., “ [I] can’t sleep” and “[have] nightmares”).   
Physical harm. This measure includes any mention of physical effects arising after the 
crime. Examples of these statements include witnesses experiencing “drug dependency,” 
“developed shingles,” and reporting general “health problems.”   
Family significance. Family significance refers to the degree to which the victim was a 
central and present member of the family (i.e., how involved), and the degree to which the family 
depended on them. Examples of family significance include mention that the deceased “always 
preached about family” and “was always there” and included instances where significance was 
implied by loss (e.g., “we can’t celebrate holidays the same way anymore”).   
Victim character. Victim character refers to explicit mention of the qualities of the 
deceased or that mention how they were regarded by others. Often these refer to single terms 
(e.g., caring, honest), and at other times refer to behaviors indicative of the deceased character 
(e.g., “serious student and worker,” and “worked with troubled youth”).   
Social standing/social value. As a subset of victim character, this category captures 
whether the witness mentions the victim’s relationship to the community, or how involved they 
were or valuable they were to society (i.e., they were a doctor that helped save lives, etc.). The 
degree to which the victim was well regarded, held in esteem, or held ties to their community 




Emotions described. Any description or mention of emotions the witness conveyed 
either at the present time (e.g., “I’m sad,” “I’m angry right now”) or at any time since the crime 
(e.g., “I’m heartbroken,” “I’m sad all the time”). This category refers to explicit descriptions of 
emotions by the witness, including instances where witness may have become emotional when 
testifying. However, if the witness did not explain how they were feeling, but the transcript 
indicates they were crying on the stand (some transcripts mention this), they were scored as 
describing emotions. No distinctions were made about the specific types of emotions described.  
Because of the importance of emotion to the VIS debate, any mention of emotion fit this 
category, even if emotions were mentioned in other categories (e.g., psychological harm).  So, 
when individuals spoke of feeling depressed we characterized them as fitting the psychological 
harm category, but we also included them as also meeting the category of emotions described.  
Defendant mentioned. This category includes any reference to the defendant either 
using the name directly or using pronouns or terms that suggest the defendant (e.g., “him,” “he,” 
“whoever did this crime”).   
Defendant dehumanized.  This category includes any mention of the defendant in 
dehumanizing terms (e.g., “you became an animal”) and it also refers to acts implying that the 
actor was less than human (e.g., if the defendant was described as engaging in “monstrous 
actions”).  
Brutality of crime expressed. This category includes witnesses describing any aspects 
of the crime, including the brutality of the act.   
Recommended punishment. This category includes any mention of punishment or 




punishment possible”). Expressions by the witness that suggest the defendant should pay for his 
actions but not under the control of the criminal justice system were not scored as recommended 
punishment (e.g., “may you rot in hell”).    
Emotional language in VIS 
 The Emotional content of the VIS was also examined using the Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC) program developed by Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis (2015).  LIWC 
calculates the degree to which people use different categories of words across a wide array of 
texts. In the present study, VIS was isolated from the trial transcripts and analyzed. Two 
subscales of the analysis were of interest in the present study; anger and sadness. The Anger 
subscale is comprised of a word count that includes 230 anger related words (alpha = .97) and 
the Sadness subscale is comprised of 136 sadness related words (alpha = .91)  
RESULTS 
Characteristics of VIS Presentations 
 The word counts were recorded for the transcripts. Consequently, statements by the court, 
or by attorneys were included in the word count, because in many instances the questions posed 
were critical to the comprehension of the VIS, and so leaving out these words from the total 
count would have made little sense. However, for the most part, information coming from the 
court or an attorney reflected a small proportion of the total word count. Based on this approach, 
analysis for word count revealed lengths ranging from a low of 71 to a high of 8329 and a 
median length of 723 words (M = 1059.72, SD = 1120.08; 95% CI = 900.28-1219.16). As shown 
in Table 1, the reported means and standard deviations revealed that the word count varied 




question-and-answer format where the prosecutor directly examines the VIS witness, F (2,189) = 
19.52, p < .001, 2 = .17; 95% CI = .08-.26.   
 In total, 69.7 % of VIS witnesses are female and 28.6% are male (in 1.7% of cases gender 
could not be determined). The relation to the victim was fairly dispersed among all categories, 
but parent (25.5%) was most common and child (16.7%) was next, whereas spouse (7.8%) was 
among the least common type of witness identity. Examining the number of VIS per case, we 
found that an average of 2.65 (Median = 2) VIS were presented in each case, and the number of 
VIS ranged from 1 to 14. It was rare for information concerning the age and ethnicity of the 
witness to be mentioned, and so this information is not reported.  
One important finding from the VIS transcripts was that across jurisdictions, VIS were 
delivered in many different ways. In the free narrative method, the victim survivor read a 
statement that had been prepared and written prior to the court appearance. In the question-and-
answer method, the prosecuting attorney conducted a direct examination of the VIS witness and 
the defense attorney would, in rare cases, cross examine the witness. In some cases, during the 
course of the direct examination, the witness also read a prepared statement.  In those rare 
instances, we coded the testimony as a question and answer format. Both of these methods were 
carried out in front of the jury prior to the jury’s sentencing decisions. The post-sentencing 
method was conducted after the jury rendered their sentence but before the judge meted out the 
sentence. As can be seen in Table 1, of the three methods, the question-answer method was most 
common among our transcripts (55.6%), the free narrative method was less common (21.7%), 
and, surprising to us, a not insignificant percentage of VIS (22.8%) were presented to a judge 
without the jury present. Although more females than males were VIS witnesses, there were no 
significant gender differences across VIS type, X
2




Content Analysis of the VIS 
Raters independently coded all VIS transcripts and the percentages for each category 
along with Kappa levels are reported in Table 2. The inter-rater agreement for each category 
using Kappa varied from .66 (relayed emotions) to .91 (mentioned defendant and recommended 
punishment), with an average of k = .79, where Kappa levels above .61 are characterized as 
substantial agreement (McHugh, 2012). In instances of disagreement between the two 
independent raters, a third rater provided the final judgment after reviewing the transcript. 
Percentages are based on ratings after all discrepancies were resolved.  
 In terms of the common elements present in the VIS testimony, and contrary to the stated 
purpose behind victim impact statements, information concerning the physical (9.4%), 
psychological (26.6%), and financial (3.6%) impact of the crime on the victims and their family 
was infrequently present in the statements. Some discussion of victim character was commonly 
addressed in the statements (76.6%). These descriptions may have been as brief as mentioning a 
trait about the deceased (e.g., “loving,” “compassionate”) to lengthier descriptions of the victim’s 
characteristics such as brief anecdotes about their accomplishments (e.g., “10 years with the 
Guard,” “accepted into law school”). If we also restrict descriptions of the victim to social 
standing/social value, where descriptions of social standing concerned how well regarded they 
were by their community or their ties to the community, then instances of this type were much 
less common (16.7%).  
 In many cases, the description of the victim focused on the importance of the member to 
the family unit. Information about the importance of the deceased to the surviving family and 




statements (56.8%). This significance to the family in most instances described the victim’s 
involvement with the family and the degree to which they were a critical part of their everyday 
lives. There are numerous examples of these statements (e.g., “he wasn’t going anywhere 
without his children or her” and “he really wanted to support them, you know, and have money 
for college and all that”). Clear descriptions of the degree to which the family depended on the 
victim and therefore would be damaged by their loss, (e.g., mention of the degree to which the 
defendant was the sole breadwinner) was much less common, occurring in only 13% of the 
transcripts analyzed.   
 Analysis of content concerning emotions included instances where the witness described 
their feelings, used emotional terms, or appeared to demonstrate emotional demeanor (e.g., 
crying). Results of the analysis of emotional content of the statements using linguistic analysis 
are presented in a later section. Thus, content analysis described in this section concern rather 
broad mentions of emotion within the VIS, encompassing scenarios where the witness described 
how they felt, or were likely to feel in the coming months or years. Instances where the witness 
described these feelings were common (66.7%). It is noteworthy that in many instances the 
witnesses would not explicitly name the emotion but instead convey the magnitude of their 
emotional experience (e.g., “I felt like there was an earthquake that had fallen over me”), or they 
detailed emotional shifts or struggles to deal with emotion (e.g., “I see-sawed between hope and 
despair”), or indicated that their emotional experience was not likely to change over time (e.g., “I 
don’t think my pain is ever going to be healed”).   
 References to the defendant occurred in a number (30.7%) of cases, but when the 
defendant was mentioned it tended to be little more than a single pronoun such as “he” or “him.” 




to him (e.g., “I hope every morning your eyes pop open because of the image of what you’ve 
done to my mom”). Rarer still were instances where the defendant was dehumanized (6.3%). We 
restricted our instances of dehumanization to cases where nonhuman terms were used to describe 
the defendant, rather than simply utterances of hate or vengeance directed toward the defendant.  
Few instances of direct dehumanization (e.g., “he should be put down like a rabid dog” and “you 
became an animal”) were observed in the transcripts we examined.  Somewhat more common 
(16.7%) were descriptions of the crime itself, or the brutality of the act. This relatively broad 
category included instances where the witness called attention to the needlessness of the murder, 
highlighting the defendant’s lack of concern for harming others. We also examined testimony for 
instances in which the witness recommended or requested a punishment outcome for the 
defendant. We restricted coding of recommended punishment to instances where the witness 
appeared to appeal to the jury about an appropriate sentence, and not to instances where they 
wanted the defendant to suffer for his actions (e.g., “rot in hell”). Here, we see that punishment 
was recommended in 14.1% of the transcripts we examined (e.g., “I feel that he does deserve the 
maximum sentence on everything”).    
 One element which was not identified a priori as a topic of analysis, but appeared in a 
number (33.3%) of the statements we analyzed, was a description of the personal experience of 
first learning about the crime. This trauma narrative emerged with a relatively consistent pattern. 
In some cases, they were prompted by the prosecutor (e.g., “tell the court how you learned of his 
death”), while in other instances they emerged unsolicited. In each of these cases, witnesses 
described how they learned about the crime, and often described their shock or behaviors that 




dropped the phone and began to scream”). In many instances, they depicted these trauma 
narratives as shocking and life-altering events from which they have not recovered.    
 In Table 2, VIS content was broken down into the three formats of free-narrative, 
question and answer, and post-sentencing.  Percentages in which each of the content categories 
(e.g., dehumanized defendant) was therefore reported separately for each presentation format.  A 
series of Chi-Square Goodness of Fit tests were conducted to determine if the percentages across 
presentation formats departed significantly from one another and we set the per comparison 
alpha level at .005 in order to control for alpha inflation.  As reported in Table 2, you see 
significant differences across half of the content areas: (1) personal character, (2) learned of 
death, (3) mentioned defendant, (4) crime brutality, (5) recommended punishment, and (6) 
physical harm.  Personal character of the victim was least likely and the defendant was most 
likely to be mentioned in post-sentencing VIS. Crime brutality and recommendations for 
punishment were least likely to appear in the question and answer VIS, but accounts of how the 
witness learned of the victim’s death were most likely to appear in this format. Accounts of 
physical harm were most likely to appear in the free narrative VIS. 
 In Table 3, VIS content was broken down by sentencing decision (life/death). Here, a 
series of Chi-Square Goodness of Fit tests were conducted to examine differences percentages 
across the sentencing outcome categories. When controlling for alpha inflation for the 12 tests 
using p < .005 as the per comparison type I error rate, none of the categories were found to differ 






Analysis of Emotional Content of VIS Transcripts 
The LWIC process scores the level of emotionality contained in the statement based on 
the percentage of total words falling into a particular word category. The program identifies out 
of a possible count of 230 anger words and 136 sadness words the percentage of total word count 
for each transcript that contained the category anger and sadness. For example, if the sadness 
count was 1.0, it indicated that 1% of the total word count consisted of words belonging to the 
sadness category. Therefore, given that it represents the percentage of total words, scores reflect 
the density of the particular emotion category within a statement.  
 Emotionality of VIS was analyzed by separating VIS into the three different modes of 
presentation; free narrative, question-and-answer, and post sentencing, reasoning that the 
different methods of VIS presentation might vary in emotional content. A linear mixed effect 
model ANOVA was run to examine the Emotion Type (Anger versus Sadness, as a within-
subjects variable) by Presentation Type (Question-and-Answer, Free Narrative, and Post-
Sentencing, as a between subject variable). The analysis yielded a significant main effect for 
Emotion Type (F (1, 188) = 12.65, p = .0005,  2 = .06; 95% CI = .01-.14). Overall, the VIS 
contained more sadness (M = .69, SD = .71, 95% CI [.59 - .79]) than anger (M = .48, SD = .58, 
95% CI [.40 - .56]). The effect of Emotion Type was qualified, however, by a significant 
interaction of Emotion with VIS Type; F (1, 188) = 5.07, p = .03,  2 = .03; 95% CI = 0.0001-
.09.  
An analysis of simple main effects focusing on Emotion Type revealed that when the 
Presentation Type was post-sentencing there were no significant differences between anger and 




free-narrative VIS, there was significantly more sadness than anger in the VIS (F (1, 105) = 
14.72, p < .001,  2 = .12; 95% CI = .03-.24 and F (1, 37) = 8.54, p = .006,  2 = .19; 95% CI = 
0.02-.39 respectively. See Figure 1. 
Simple main effects focusing on Presentation Type revealed a significant difference in 
anger scores by VIS type, F (2, 187) = 14.89, p < .001,  2 = .14; 95% CI = 0.05-.22.  Post hoc 
comparisons using Tukey’s revealed that anger scores were significantly higher in the Post-
Sentencing versus Question-and-Answer format (95% CI for the difference -.72 to -.27, p < 
.001). Anger scores were also significantly higher in the Free Narrative versus Question-and-
Answer format (95% CI for the difference scores .08 to .56, p = .005). There were no significant 
differences in anger scores between the Post-Sentencing and Free-Narrative VIS formats. With 
regard to sadness, the analysis revealed no significant differences by Presentation Type; F (2, 
188) = 1.50, p = .22,  2 = .016; 95% CI = 0.0-.06. See Figure 1.  
We also examined whether emotionality of VIS, as measured by LIWC scores, differed 
between male and female witnesses. We conducted two ANOVAS with LIWC scores as the 
dependent variables and gender as the independent variable. With regard to sadness, no 
significant differences were found, F(1, 178) = .18, p = .67,  2 = .001; 95% CI = 0.0-.03. Male 
and female witnesses expressed similar amounts of sadness in their VIS (M = .64, SD= .72, 95% 
CI [.44 - .84] and M = .69, SD = .68, 95% CI [.57 - .81] respectively). Similarly, there were no 
significant differences in expressions of anger between males and females, F(1, 178) =  1.47, p = 
.23,  2 = .008; 95% CI = 0.0-.05. Males expresses similar amounts of anger (M = .38, SD = .37, 




We next sought to determine the relationship between emotion-expression (i.e., anger & 
sadness) in VIS and death penalty verdicts. There was often multiple VIS per trial. To ensure 
independence of observations, it was therefore necessary to calculate the average level of anger- 
and sadness-expression across all VIS witnesses in a given trial, and use this variable in analyses. 
As such, the effective sample size for these analyses was only 52, and statistical power should be 
considered somewhat modest. For these analyses, Death-Verdicts was dummy-coded as death = 
1 and life = 0. VIS Format was dummy-coded as Question-and-Answer format = 1 and Free 
Narrative = 0. 
Initial zero-order correlations suggested that Sadness-Expression was negatively 
correlated with Death-Verdicts, r = -.33, p = .01, 95% CI = -.55, -.06, but Anger-Expression was 
not related to Death-Verdicts, r = -.12, p = .40, 95% CI = -.37, .16. There was also some (non-
significant) suggestion of a positive relationship between Anger- and Sadness-Expression, r = 
.22, p = .11, 95% CI = -.05, .47. Echoing analyses reported above, however, the Question-and-
Answer Format was also associated with less Sadness-Expression, r = -.49, p = .0003, 95% CI = 
-.62, -.16, and less Anger-Expression, r = -.41, p = .002, 95% CI = -.67, -.24. There was also 
some indication that the Question-and-Answer Format was related to greater Death-Verdicts, r = 
.27, p = .054, 95% CI = -.007, .50. 
It was thus not clear from the zero-order correlations which variable was most directly 
related to Death-Verdicts. As such, we next simultaneously entered all three variables as 
predictors of Death-Verdicts in a logistic regression in order to determine each variable’s unique 
effect. When this was done, Anger-Expression continued to exhibit a clearly non-significant 
effect (unstandardized b = -.02, standardized β = -.005, 95% CI of β = -.37, .36, Wald χ
2
 = 




β = -.75, .08, Wald χ
2
 = 2.53, p = .11) and Presentation Format (unstandardized b = .61, 
standardized β = .16, 95% CI of β = -.22, .55, Wald χ
2
 = .70, p = .40) also exhibited non-
significant effects with Death-Verdicts. However, it should also be noted that these effects 
qualify as medium and small effect sizes, respectively (i.e., according to their standardized 
regression coefficient; Cohen, 1988). Thus, it’s quite possible that future research with greater 
statistical power could establish their reliability. 
DISCUSSION 
 Analysis of 192 capital trial VIS transcripts revealed substantial variability in the 
statement content, highlighting the fact that no single study on VIS could adequately represent 
the information jurors experience in capital trials. Nevertheless, there were a few consistencies 
that emerged within the transcripts, thereby providing some guidance to researches wishing to 
examine the effects of VIS testimony using more ecologically valid stimuli that better represents 
actual capital trials. In addressing these common elements, we focus first on procedural issues 
(i.e., how VIS are presented) along with some common content emerging from witnesses.  
 With regard to witness characteristics and procedural issues surrounding VIS 
presentation, the findings revealed that witnesses were nearly three times as likely to be female 
than male, they were most frequently a parent, and the question-and-answer format occurs 
approximately 2.5 times more often than the free narrative format. Surprisingly, the free 
narrative format is not more common than a post-sentencing VIS delivered to a judge with the 
jury out of the room. The length of VIS testimonies varied greatly, but averaged approximately 
1500 words.  Multiple witnesses presenting a VIS is the modal scenario:  arising more than three 




 In terms of some commonalities in content, looking across all formats, VIS regularly 
contain characteristics of the victim, and expressions of the emotional suffering the victim 
survivors have experienced arises frequently. In contrast, although the stated purpose of VIS 
include highlighting “information concerning any harm, including financial, social, 
psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the offense” (Booth v 
Maryland, 1987, p. 517), this category of information reflects a small part of what jurors 
typically hear. Moreover, although Booth addressed concerns surrounding VIS allowing victims 
to suggest appropriate punishment, the analysis of the 192 VIS transcripts revealed that any 
mention of the defendant, including the witness using dehumanizing terms regarding the 
defendant as well as any recommendations for punishment, are very rare events--happening in 
less than 1 in every 10 cases.  As a general rule, VIS tended to focus on the qualities of the 
victim that will be missed, and how the survivors were dealing with their grief.   
 Some interesting patterns emerged regarding VIS content when the format of VIS 
presentation was considered. For example, while any mention of the defendant or a 
recommended punishment was a rare event overall, it was a fairly common element in post-
sentencing scenarios where no jury was present. In those instances, the VIS was presented only 
to the judge (and presumably) in the presence of the defendant. Mention of the crime and the 
level of brutality of the act was significantly more common.  Moreover, some controversial 
aspects of VIS such as mention of the defendant, or the crime, or any suggestion for punishment 
arose very infrequently overall, but most often in post-sentencing VIS with no jury present. This 
focus on the defendant, his actions, and the degree of brutality he inflicted is consonant with a 




of the VIS may shift toward a witness unburdening themselves of their hatred toward the 
defendant.  
 Differences in content across the two sentencing outcomes were also examined. When 
controlling for type I error rate inflation arising from multiple comparisons, none of the content 
categories differed in frequencies across the sentencing outcomes.  In fact, in almost all cases, 
life and death cases were remarkably similar in the VIS content. The lone exception was the 
likelihood that the testimony included how the survivor learned of the victim’s death.  These 
narratives were more than twice as likely to arise in death cases than in cases leading to a life 
sentence, although this difference failed to reach statistical significance.   
The Prevalence of Victim Character Information and Emotionality in VIS 
 Victim characteristics.  The Booth, Gathers, and Payne decisions focused on the 
relevance of victim information to sentencing judgments. Ultimately, the appropriateness for 
victim survivors to address the personal qualities of the victim was supported in Payne v. 
Tennessee (1991). Allowing the jury to see the victim as more than a “faceless stranger”, or 
someone who mattered to the victim survivors and their community was one of the chief 
arguments in Payne in support of the introduction of VIS into capital sentencing proceedings.  
 However, information concerning victim qualities remains controversial because the 
Payne Court was unclear about whether the reputation of the victim or their social standing in the 
community warrants consideration by the jury (Logan, 2000; 2005). In addition, in the Booth 
decision, Chief Justice Douglas noted that the Court does not wish to imply “that defendants 
whose victims were assets to their community are somehow more deserving of punishment than 




tolerate such distinctions’ (Booth v. Maryland, 1987, p. 506).   
In the present content analysis, mention of the victim and their personal qualities was 
common. In more than half the transcripts, the description of the victim focused chiefly on how 
their loss was likely experienced by the surviving family. This is consistent with the perspective 
in Payne and prior findings by Mitchell et al. (2016) that VIS provides an opportunity to convey 
the harm caused by the defendant’s actions—information of direct relevance to sentencing. 
However, descriptions of the victim’s reputation in the community, or their social standing, was 
infrequently present in the VIS testimonies; occurring in less than 1 in every 6 transcripts.  
Whereas sentencing outcome did not differ in terms of the likelihood that victim characteristics 
was present in the testimony, this is not the case with VIS format.  Looking across VIS formats 
we see that descriptions of the victim characteristics occur significantly less frequently in cases 
where the jury is not present.  Perhaps letting the jury see the victim as more than a “faceless 
stranger” may be regarded by victim survivors as more pertinent than providing this information 
before a judge. 
 Emotionality of VIS. In Booth and later Payne, the U.S. Supreme Court voiced concerns 
regarding prejudicial effects of VIS due to their potential to be inflammatory. This issue has been 
investigated by a number of researchers using a jury simulation approach and the findings have 
tended to show that angry jurors are more likely to sentence the defendant to death than sad 
jurors (e.g., Nunez et al., 2017).  In the present investigation, the emotional nature of VIS was 
examined by measuring information present in the VIS likely to generate emotions in jurors 
(e.g., descriptions of their emotional pain and suffering), but also by conducting a linguistic 




  The data reveals that in approximately two-thirds of the cases we reviewed, witnesses 
sought to convey the emotional suffering they experienced as a result of the crime. The 
emotional devastation associated with the death of a loved one is frequently conveyed through a 
description of the experience in which the witness first learned that the victim had been killed. 
These trauma narratives are relatively descriptive and delivered in a manner that promotes the 
likelihood that the jury will take their perspective and imagine what it would be like to learn this 
tragic news. In many cases, this testimony was prompted by the prosecutor, who specifically 
asked the witness to relay this information. Thus, these trauma narratives were more likely to be 
present in the question-and-answer VIS format. Although these elements of VIS have not been 
systematically studied to determine their influence on jurors, the fact that they depict life-
changing moments may resonate with jurors who can imagine learning tragic news about a loved 
one, and researchers have suggested that the degree to which jurors may take the victim’s 
perspective can play an important role in punishment (e.g., see Judges, 1999; Kirchmeier, 2005).    
A linguistic frequency analysis revealed that emotional content regularly occurred 
throughout VIS testimony, and sadness terms were 44% more prevalent than angry terms in 
these testimonies. However, the overall level of emotionality in these transcripts indicated that 
less than one half of one percent of all words were angry, and only slightly more than one half of 
one percent were sad. Consequently, concerns that the overall level of emotionality present in 
VIS is excessive could benefit from some perspective. Based on comparing these findings to the 
norms reported by Pennebaker et al (2015), mean sadness scores in a typical VIS (M = .69) are 
more than twice as high as you would see in natural speech (M = .23) or an article in the New 
York Times (M = .29), and slightly higher than is typical of novels (M = .55). Mean anger scores 




(M = .47) and novels (M = .51), and slightly higher than typically found in natural speech (M = 
.36). Thus, while emotional language does find its way into VIS testimony, the overall level of 
anger and sadness does not distinguish it from levels present in other contexts encountered in 
everyday life.   
The format in which the VIS is presented bears some association with the degree of 
emotionality present in the testimony. Indeed, with the exception of post-sentencing testimony 
where the witness addresses the court and the defendant, but after the jury has already rendered a 
sentencing recommendation, VIS was significantly more likely to contain sad content than angry 
content. The fact that post-sentencing produced such a considerable increase in angry content is 
interesting and may occur for a number of reasons.  First, many courts restrict what a witness can 
say in the VIS when witnesses direct their testimony to the jury.  In the post-sentencing phase, 
when the jury no longer has a role in sentencing, the VIS becomes more about offering the 
witness an opportunity to address either the judge or the defendant. The tendency for the 
prevalence of anger and sadness to vary as a function of whether the testimony is given pre- or 
post-sentencing may be partly a function of the degree to which courts have limited the content 
of the testimony when presented in front of jurors, and partly a function of who the testimony is 
directed toward.  
Little is known regarding what specific emotions prosecutors may attempt to elicit in 
witnesses, but eliciting sadness might be a goal in an attempt to gain sympathy from the jury 
(Burr, 2003). If this is true, then the sad language pervading VIS in which a question-and-answer 
format is used could be in part a result of prosecution strategies to elicit emotional responses in 
jurors. And our finding that the question-and-answer format was correlated with an increase in 




get harsher sentencing decisions. Future research might examine the goals and strategies 
prosecuting attorneys use in presenting VIS to a jury. Given the high prevalence of the 
question/answer VIS format, prosecuting attorneys are afforded ample discretion in directing 
VIS testimony. Thus, their views are particularly relevant in this area. 
The relation between sentencing outcome and the degree to which the VIS terms reflect 
anger and sadness was examined, and there was little evidence in the present study to indicate 
higher levels of anger are associated with greater frequency of death penalty judgments. Indeed,  
the zero order correlations suggested that sadness might be a predictor of sentence, and it was 
positively related to life-sentences. This is inconsistent with the jury simulation research 
findings, and the small sample of independent cases and our inability to control for a number of 
important predictors of sentencing would suggest that future research in warranted.   
Limitations 
 The manner in which we structured this content analysis merits attention. A “top-down” 
approach to the content analysis (sometimes referred to as directed, or deductive) was used in the 
present investigation. In this approach, the researchers set the agenda for what specifically would 
be looked for in the transcripts (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This can be 
contrasted with a “bottom-up” approach (sometimes referred to as inductive, conventional, or 
grounded theory) where the materials would first be examined for important themes that arise, 
without any preconceived notions about the content areas examined (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; 
Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Strijbos, Martens, Prins, & Jochems, 2006). The only factor we assessed 
which was generated from the content (i.e., bottom up) was the theme of the trauma narrative, 




every other case, the data we obtained was specifically identified a priori. Consequently, it could 
be argued that our analysis missed some important themes that characterize the nature of VIS in 
capital sentencing proceedings.   
 For the present investigation, this directed approach focused on the analysis of specific 
content that would best inform researchers who investigate the effects of VIS on jurors, and that 
would address issues of contention among legal commenters with regard to the constitutionality 
of VIS. With regard to the former, the degree to which jury simulation studies conducted thus far 
adequately represent presentation format, the length of the testimony, the relationship of the 
witness to the victim, and the type of information commonly provided in the testimony (e.g., 
emotional content, characteristics of victim, mention of defendant) all represent factors that are 
easily identified both in the research on VIS as well as in the transcripts we obtained. With 
respect to the latter choice, the present study focused on examining the VIS transcripts with 
regard to: (1) emotionality, (2) characterization of the victim, (3) characterization of the 
defendant and recommended punishment. While these do not represent the full spectrum of 
issues of controversy that have surrounded VIS, all three represent factors given considerable 
focus in the three critical cases of Booth, Gathers, and Payne, and all three issues represent 
content areas most easily defined in a way that could be reliably content analyzed. Moreover, 
this approach also allows for conclusions about what is rare, and what is common, whereas a 
more conventional approach would not analyze rare factors because they would not emerge in 
the first place as common themes. Nevertheless, an approach driven by the content of the 
transcripts rather than the specific a priori factors identified by investigators would likely yield a 




 A second limitation with the present investigation was the sampling method used to 
obtain VIS transcripts. The sample obtained was not random, but rather was a convenience 
sample based on all death penalty cases tried that year (McCord, 2005). While the cases in 
question occurred more than a decade ago, the sample used in this investigation is unlikely to 
have yielded differences in how VIS testimony is typically presented today as the cases analyzed 
in the current study all occurred after the Payne decision, which marked a significant change in 
how VIS was handled by courts (Blume, 2003; Pitt, 2013).  Indeed, a report by Sanderford 
(2012) along with recent analysis of state statutes concerning VIS supports the notion that only a 
few states have undergone changes with regard to how VIS is administered since our sample was 
taken, and these issues would have little impact on our findings. Moreover, while per-page costs 
were a consideration on which transcripts were obtained, whether or not a VIS was present in the 
transcript was unknown to us before the transcript was sent, and so we have little reason to 
assume that our sampling approach led to any systematic differences in VIS testimonies that 
would have impacted the representativeness of the data. Moreover, an additional limitation is 
that while the outcome of the case (life or death) was not discussed as a hypothesis for our study 
with coders, they were nevertheless not kept blind to the outcome of the case.  
 Our study focused on VIS in death penalty cases that have been tried in the United States. 
Thus, we cannot speak to VIS that might be presented in non-capital cases or VIS presented in 
other countries that allow VIS (e.g., Australia, or the UK). However, with regard to VIS that is 
presented in death penalty cases, our work may be particularly relevant, given that the United 
States is the only known country that allows both the death penalty and VIS. 
 Lastly, our analysis of the level of emotionality in VIS fails to address subtle factors that 




someone tells the story, their ability to articulate grief, and facial expressions they make all likely 
play a role in how the jury is likely to respond to the testimony.  This is an initial attempt at 
trying to measure the content of VIS, and so we encourage further research that takes alternative 
approaches to measuring the emotional impact of VIS.   
Policy Implications   
 The findings here suggest a number of changes that would be necessary for simulation 
research to better represent VIS that occur in actual trials (e.g., witness characteristics, examples 
of content). However, it is also important to identify areas in which existing policies concerning 
VIS may be discordant with the research findings, as well as highlighting findings that support 
existing practices.  The chief issue of contention regarding VIS in capital sentencing concerns its 
relevance to the sentencing process, and this issue has already been decided in Payne v. 
Tennessee (1991). Whether victim character information should be heard and whether it is 
appropriate for testimony that is emotional to be present when jurors decide punishment are legal 
questions that cannot be answered by jury decision making researchers.  Instead, the appropriate 
role here is for psychology to inform the debate by answering relevant empirical questions such 
as whether victim character information influence how jurors decide punishment, and which 
specific emotions lead to harsher sanctions.  The findings in the present investigation are meant 
to shed some light on whether the kinds of studies researchers are conducting in the laboratories 
are reflective of the kinds of VIS evidence typically present in the courtroom.    
Efforts to limit VIS have been promoted in a number of states since Payne v Tennessee 
(e.g., see Blume, 2003; Frankel, 2008; Sanderford, 2012). VIS are regarded by many as 




promote prejudice is unmistakable (Frankel, 2008). Laboratory studies examining emotions and 
legal judgment place the average effect size of modest-to-moderate in magnitude (Feigenson, 
2016). Consequently, as we noted earlier, a number of states have passed laws restricting the 
degree of emotionality permissible in a VIS. But, how to enforce these restrictions is another 
matter. Previous research on VIS and emotions suggest that the type of emotion elicited matters, 
and the present findings may provide some direction in establishing practices which could limit 
the potential for VIS to be prejudicial.  
 The research on the emotional effects of VIS on jurors thus far suggests that sentencing 
judgments are likely to be impacted, but only when jurors are angered, not when they are 
saddened (Nuñez et al., 2017; Myers et al., 2018).  The present findings indicate that while 
emotional language does populate VIS testimony, sadness is present much more commonly than 
is anger, which was encountered in less than one-half of one percent of all words in the VIS. Of 
course, this study as well as jury simulation studies we review have failed to address the 
numerous factors during trial that may mitigate the effects of emotion on judgments.  But, 
because previous studies have indicated a pattern whereby anger promotes harsher sentencing 
but sadness does not, it was important in the present investigation to identify how frequently 
emotional content arises in VIS. 
 If courts are concerned about the emotionality of VIS, one practical way to limit the 
degree to which anger is introduced into the courtroom is through the format by which the VIS is 
presented. As we noted, free-narrative format is much less common than a question-and-answer 
format whereby the prosecutor directs the testimony of the witness. Linguistically, anger was 
most common in the post-sentencing format when the jury had already made their sentencing 




anger scores occurring for the question-and-answer format. Limiting VIS to this format may be 
one approach to limit the anger expressed in the testimony, and this format also affords the judge 
an opportunity to halt proceedings before a witness answers if the question posed by the 
prosecutor is judged to likely promote an angry response from the witness (e.g., if a prosecutor 
asked witness if they had something to say to the defendant). Consequently, this format allows 
victims to speak before the jury, but it does not give them free rein.     
Limiting this opinion testimony may allow the court to limit the degree of anger present 
in the VIS. Anecdotally, instances have been reported where angry witnesses confront the 
defendant and appeal to the jury for vengeance (e.g., in some cases witnesses “begged” juries to 
impose death, while in other cases witnesses have prompted jurors to “show no mercy”, see 
Logan, 2005). Our present findings suggest that any mention of the defendant is extremely rare, 
and calls for punishment are rarer still. Less can be said about the potential impact of this 
information on jurors, as researchers have still not systematically varied the opinions offered for 
punishment to determine if they do indeed influence sentencing judgments. However, it is 
perhaps worth noting that VIS itself typically fails to produce strong effect sizes in simulation 
studies, and the most reliable effects occur when VIS provoke an anger response in participants 
(Myers et al., 2018). Going forward, systematically studying how statements directed at the 
defendant that specifically request harsh punishments would better inform decisions regarding 
the prejudicial effects of this testimony. Importantly, in the present investigation, any comments 
directed specifically at the defendant occurred vary rarely, and when it did, it was most likely 
when the jury was not present to hear the testimony.  
In conclusion, the present investigation suggests that jury simulation research on VIS 




victim and the witness, the number of witnesses, and the format in which the VIS is presented.  
The question and answer format is most common, and suggests the prosecutors who direct the 
questioning have great influence on what information the jury hears during a VIS.  In most 
instances, they direct witnesses to convey the emotional toll experienced by the victim survivors 
in dealing with their loss, and convey to the jury the personal qualities of the deceased. Very 
rarely do they address the defendant or allow witnesses to vent their anger toward the defendant.  
Anger is far less prevalent in VIS testimony than is sadness, and when anger is more common, it 
typically occurs when the jury is not present and therefore not in danger experiencing the 
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Table 1.  
Content Analysis: Wordcount, Witness Gender, and Relation to Victim by VIS Format 
   All Formats  Free-Narr. Q &A  Post 
Wordcount:  
M  1059.7   624.8  1478.5  491.5 
SD  1120.1   469.3  1312.8  484.5    
Witness Gender n (%)   n (%)  n (%)  n (%)   
 Female 134 (69.3)  28 (68.3) 75 (71.4) 31 (72.1) 
 Male    55 (28.6)  13 (31.7) 30 (28.6) 12 (27.9) 
 
Relation to Victim n (%)   n (%)  n (%)  n (%)   
Parent   49 (26.5)  11 (28.2) 30 (29.4)   8 (18.2) 
Child   32 (17.3)  7 (17.9) 17 (16.7)   8 (18.2) 
Relative*  31 (16.8)  7 (17.9) 12 (11.8) 12 (27.3) 
Sibling   30 (16.2)  8 (20.5) 16 (15.7)   6 (13.6) 
Friend   22 (11.9)  1 (2.6)  16 (15.7)   5 (11.4) 
Spouse   15 (8.1)  5 (12.8)   9 (8.8)   1 (2.3) 
Multiple**  6 (3.2)   0 (0.0)    2 (2.0)   4 (9.1) 
    
Note: For the above table, in cases where data is missing (e.g., gender of witness was not 
provided or a statement was read by a third party meant to represent the feelings of an entire 
family), percentages are based on total available scores (i.e., valid percent). * Note: Relative 
when the witness is related but does not fit into existing categories of sibling, parent, spouse, or 
child. ** Note: In the case of multiple victims, a witness may represent multiple roles (e.g., 





Table 2.  
Content Analysis: Content Categories Across VIS Formats: Frequencies, Kappa, and Chi-
Square Goodness of Fit Scores.   
   All Formats  Free Narr. Q&A  Post 
Category  n (%)  K** n (%)   n (%)  n (%)  X
2
 
Relayed emotions 128 (66.7) .66 24 (58.5) 77 (73.3) 27 (58.7) 2.05  
Personal character 121 (63.0) .85 27 (65.9)  27 (73.3) 17 (37.0) 12.42* 
    Social value     50 (26.0) .84 11 (26.8) 33 (31.4)   6 (13.0) 7.55 
Family signif.  109 (56.8) .72 19 (46.3) 68 (64.8) 23 (50.0) 3.74 
Learned death    64 (33.3) .89   9 (22.0) 48 (45.7)   7 (15.2) 19.11* 
Mentioned defend   59 (30.7) .91 13 (31.7) 13 (12.4) 33 (71.7) 48.28* 
    Defendant dehum   12 (6.3) .85   5 (12.2)   4 (3.8)   3 (6.5) 4.26 
Psychological harm   51 (26.6) .73  12 (29.3) 28 (26.7) 11 (23.9) 0.48 
Crime brutality   32 (16.7) .67   9 (22.0)   9 (8.6) 14 (30.4) 11.05* 
Recommended punish  27 (14.1) .91 13 (31.7)   1 (1.0) 22 (47.8) 42.30* 
Physical harm    18 (9.4) .71 11 (26.8)   6 (5.7)   1 (2.2) 30.91* 
Financial harm     7 (3.6) .72   4 (9.8)   2 (1.9)   1 (2.2) 9.14 
   n = 192  n = 41  n = 105 n = 46 
* Chi-Square Goodness of Fit tests using df = 2 and significant at p < .005. ** Kappa scores 






Table 3.  
VIS Content by Sentencing Outcome.  
     Life   Death    
Category    n %  n %  X
2
  
Relayed emotions   47 62.7  81 69.2  0.32 
Personal character   42 56.0  79 67.5  1.07 
    Social value   13 17.3  19 16.2  0.05 
Family significance   37 49.3  72 61.5  1.34 
Learned death    15 20.0  49 41.9  7.75 
Mentioned defendant   23 30.7  36 30.8  0.01 
    Defendant dehumanized  4 5.3  8 6.8  0.19 
Psychological harm   17 22.7  34 29.1  0.80 
Crime brutality   16 21.3  16 13.7  1.65 
Recommended punishment  14 18.7  13 11.1  1.94 
Physical harm    7 9.3  11 9.4  0.01 
Financial harm    3 4.0  4 3.4  0.05 
     75 39.1  117 60.9    







Figure 1: Anger and Sadness Content of VIS 
 
 
 
